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TNTRODUCTION 
The fate of radical working class movements in the west has been closely tied to the 
experience of modern warfare. Indeed, the twentieth century's two most powerful expressions of 
proletarian insurgency--the socialist and communist movements--were both decisively influenced by 
the outbreak of World Wars. 
The impact of World War I on the international socialist movement has been well 
documented. Revolution in Russia, labourism in Britain, bloody reaction in Germany, and the 
demise of socialism in America--all were in some measure by-products of war. Ushering in such 
momentous changes, World War I stands out as  "an intervening variable of such overwhelming 
significance that," as  Aristide Zolberg argues, "it provides a theoretical warrant for periodizing the 
analysis of working-class formation into distinct pre- and postwar segments."' 
An equally strong case can be made for periodizing World War 11 into "distinct pre- and 
postwar segments" of working class formation. For the developing communist movement in the 
west, the war was a great watershed, reviving some parties and destroying others. In France, for 
example, Communist trade unionists came out of World War 11 greatly strengthened; in England, 
however, the revolutionary left remained marginal to the working class, while in Belgium 
Communist influence fell off sharply from prewar leveh2 
But it was in the United States, the belligerent power most insulated from the actual 
fighting, where the left sustained some of its heaviest wartime losses. On the eve of World War 
11, Communists and their allies were a major force in the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO), wielding simcant power in some of the nation's most vital and strategic industries. With 
nearly one of every three organized industrial workers enrolled in unions that were 
euphemistically characterized as  left-wing or progressive, radicals of one type or another controlled 
a larger portion of the American labor movement than a t  any time since the founding of the AFL. 
Then came war--the critical "intervening variablen--followed by ideological retrenchment. Despite 
swollen memberships and inflated treasuries, the CIO emerged from World War 11 a shadow of its 
former self. Gone was much of the organizing energy, political idealism, and larger sense of 
purpose that had given birth to the industrial union movement a decade before. Facing the 
difficult peacetime readjustment, most unions resembled, in the words of a contemporary observer, 
"big, giant shells with vast membership figures but no insides.S 
Labor's wartime evisceration disarmed the left a t  a critical point in its development. With 
the Cold War closing in on the CIO, Communist-supported forces suffered a string of defeats, 
beginning in 1946. In the politically pivotal United Auto Workers union (UAW), a progressive 
leadership bloc lost important ground to the growing anti-communist opposition led by Walter 
Reuther. Close on the heels of Reuther's ascendancy, East Coast transport workers, led by "Fkd" 
Mike Quill, broke with the Communist Party. Then, most devastating of all, the Communists lost 
control of the National Maritime Union when some of the party's most able and admired 
representatives, including several founders of the NMU, were defeated in union elections by three- 
to-one margins. Following similar anti-communist eruptions among furniture, wood, chemical, and 
shoe workers, rightward-moving CIO leaders confidently took matters into their own hands. In 
1950 the remaining Communist-led unions--eleven affiliates with a combined membership of 
almost one million--were put on trial by the national CIO, convicted of "following the Communist 
4 Party line," and summarily expelled. 
In explaining the postwar rout of the left, most analysts focus on labor's experiences 
during the war. Their arguments ruxi in two general directions. One, a more structuralist 
explanation, traces the left's defeat to the changing and increasingly conservative composition of 
the labor force. '1n this view, the key wartime development was the displacement of veteran CIO 
militants by new workers lacking union experience or ideological attachments to the l e f t  The 
other leading explanation sees the demise of the left in more historical terms. From this 
perspective, the fatal blow was delivered by the left itself, as  a result of the "class collaborationist" 
policies pursued by many Communist-supported union leaders during the war. 6 
This article examines both arguments in light of the wartime experience of one particular 
union--the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU). Led by the 
outspoken and controversial Harry Bridges, the ILWU was a favorite target of ideological cold 
warriors. Indeed, "Red Harry" was on everyone's "most dangerous" list: West Coast shipowners 
denounced the Australian-born Bridges as  "that foreign monster" and repeatedly refused to 
negotiate with him; representatives of the federal government tried on numerous occasions to 
deport him as an "undesirable alien;" Congress went so far as to pass a special bill, mentioning 
Bridges by name, which included language written specifically to expedite his deportation; even 
some of his fellow unionists jumped onto the anti-Bridges bandwagon, accusing him of treason and 
calling for his resignation. Bridges "is the national bogey-man," wrote labor reporter Richard 
Neuberger on the eve of World War 11, "a symbol within our own country of revolutionary 
tendencies and dangerous  idea^."^ 
As the hot war turned cold, ideas that had been seen as dangerous came to be regarded a s  
subversive, and the men and women who held them, from the lowliest rank-and-filer to the highest 
union official, were either driven from the house of labor or forced to recant. But not Bridges. He 
kept hammering away a t  "the system," continually raising his voice on behalf of unpopular 
causes, whether it was the civil rights of Japanese-Americans or the rising tide of McCarthyism. 
While turning back an increasingly active opposition within his own union, Bridges also managed 
to fend off numerous raids directed against the ILWU by competing organizations. No other left- 
wing union--not even the half-million-member United Electrical Workers Union (UE) nor the 
militant Mine, Mill, and Smelters Workers--could make the same claim. During the darkest days 
I '  of the Cold War, when the rest of the left was fighting for its very survival, the ILWU was 
4 
The question is why? Why was the ILWU, one of the country's most radical unions, so 
resilient? Put differently, why was left-wing leadership so much more durable in the ILWU than 
elsewhere? 
Part of the answer has to do with the conditions attending the birth of the ILWU. 
Longshore unionism on the Pacific Coast was reconstituted in the fall of 1934 following a long and 
especially violent walkout by 30,000 West Coast marine workers. The "Big Strike" produced a 
union contract for the longshoremen and, what was more important in the long run, a deep sense 
of loyalty to Bridges and other insurgent leaders who led them into combat against the shipowners. 
This generation of "'34 men," having been forged in the heat of battle, constituted a solid base of 
support for radicalism on the docks.' That fall, Bridges defeated an old-line craft unionist for the 
presidency of the San Francisco local of the International Longshoremen's Association. 
Representing much more than a routine changing of the guard, Bridges's ascendancy signalled a 
new and more militant spirit, which soon found expression in literally hundreds of small scale 
"quickie strikes" that were aimed a t  fundamentally transforming working conditions on the job. 10 
These isolated skirmishes came together in the winter of 1936 when marine workers struck the 
West Coast once again, this time paralyzing commerce for over three months. Riding this wave of 
militancy, twelve thousand longshoremen followed Bridges out of the AFL into the CIO, forming 
the ILWU in the summer of 1937. 
As much as  the 1930s was a time of expanding political opportunities for Bridges and the 
left, World War I1 was a period of contraction. Like most of organized labor, the ILWU underwent 
a major transformation during the war, as  older workers departed, new ones arrived, and union 
priorities shifted. But that is where the similarity ends, for the ILWU, while committed along with 
the rest of the left to winning the war a t  home, also won the battle for survival that followed. 
Returning to our earlier question, what explains the extraordinary durability of radical leadership 
on the docks? In particular, what was it about the ILWU's wartime experience that made Bridges 
so much more resilient than his left-wing contemporaries? 
WARTIME UNION POLITICS AND THE LEFT 
The left's "plunge to disaster," writes Bert Cochran, began with Communist party leader 
Earl Browder "taking on unsolicited the task of war manager on the home front." Guided by the 
party's slogan "Everything for Victory" and driven by his own single-minded obsession with 
maximizing productivity, Browder's enthusiasm for the war effort knew few bounds. "We have to 
find out ways to make the capitalist system work better," he pleaded before a gathering of New 
York unionists in 1943. "And since the capitalists themselves, who are in charge of that, are not 
doing a job that satisfies us, we have to help the capitalists to learn how to run their own system 
under war conditions." l1 
Browder's stunning metamorphosis from one of the country's leading class antagonists to 
its self-appointed "captain of industry" had been triggered by Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, 
which, in the mysterious dialectic of communism, transformed the basic character of the 
developing European conflict from an "imperialist squabble" into its opposite: a popular "war of 
national liberation" against fascism. In calling for national unity to defeat the Axis powers, 
Browder counseled union leaders to set aside their peacetime differences with employers. Labor's 
enemy, he stressed, was no longer capital per se but rather the small "defeatist wing" of the 
bourgeoisie who failed to support the American-Soviet wartime coalition. "If J. P. Morgan 
supports this coalition and goes down the line for it," Browder declared in a burst of patriotism, "I, 
a s  a Communist, am prepared to clasp his hand on that and join with him to realize it. Class 
divisions have no significance now except as  they reflect on one side or the other of this issue."12 
Browder's support for the war effort was nothing if not sincere, stirring the party faithful 
in a way that the ignominious Hitler-Stalin pact never could. Within nine months of Pearl Harbor, 
15,000 members of the party and its major youth affiliate, the Young Communist League, had 
enlisted in the armed forces, including fully 30 percent of the leadership. So a s  not to a n t a g o h  
"progressive capitalists," Communists took the lead in liquidating their own presence in industry 
by abolishing Communist Party clubs, the basic unit of shop-floor organization. The next casualty 
of wartime cooperation was the party itself, which was officially dissolved in 1944 and replaced by 
the Communist Political Association. With the dissolution of the party, it was clear that the 
Communists would stop a t  nothing to realize their principal wartime objective of defeating 
fascism. 13 
This grand strategy hinged on winning "the battle for production" on the home front. 
Accordingly, many party loyalists in the labor movement called for relaxing hard-won work rules 
and voluntarily giving up any that seemed to hamper the war effort. At the same time they 
vigorously advocated a number of proposals--including those traditionally opposed by unions, such 
as  piece rates and no-strike pledges--that might speed up workers and raise output. 14 
This accommodating posture proved to be a serious liability in several unions. In the 
UAW, party support for incentive pay turned militant rank and filers into enemies. Communist 
autoworker Nat Ganley, a leader in the Detroit UAW, later admitted that the opposition's "most 
effective slogan was 'Down with Earl Browder's piecework."' Still more damaging was the 
Communists' militant enforcement of labor's no-strike pledge. Wartime walkouts in auto were 
condemned by party leaders in the most vituperative terms, as  "disgraceful . . . nothing less than 
a stab in the back of our armed services." Striking UAW members were accused of sabotaging the 
war effort and, argued the Communist Dailv Work=, "should be treated as  scabs." Even as the 
war in Europe was approaching a favorable outcome late in 1944, pro-Communist leaders clung 
tenaciously to their policy of "labor sacrifice" by leading the opposition to a UAW referendum 
aimed a t  rescinding the no-strike pledge.15 
Communists were just a s  obstinate in other unions. In the East Coast NMU they 
instructed new members on the essentials of avoiding strikes and threatened to turn over the 
names of recalcitrant seamen to local draft boards. In the UE they supported both incentive pay 
and the establishment of government-sponsored "War Production Speed-Up Committees," which 
were later renamed "Labor-Management Committees" in the interest of gaining rank-and-file 
support.16 Besides working to dampen militancy within their own unions, Communist-supported 
leaders were kept busy trying to stamp out insurgency in other industries as well. When the 
nation's coal miners struck in 1943 over an unresolved pay dispute with the War Labor Board, 
Julius Emspak, UE secretary-treasurer, urged President Roosevelt "to make it impossible for John 
L. Lewis and his henchmen to continue to organize disruption of coal production." Lewis's failure 
to prevent the walkout made him, in Bridges's opinion, "the single most effective agent of the 
fascist powers within the ranks of labor." In denouncing Lewis in this way, Emspak, Bridges, and 
other prominent leftists merely echoed the sentiments expressed by more mainstream union 
leaders. But if the left was no less timid than the rest of organized labor, neither was it any 
bolder; and that in the end proved to be its undoing.17 
The wartime absorption of the Communist Party into labor's mainstream disoriented many 
rank-and-file unionists who had previously looked to it for militant leadership. Disillusionment 
turned increasingly to anger as CP functionaries, preoccupied with their various productivity 
campaigns, neglected conditions on the shop floor. With many CIO veterans deriding the party's 
new approach as  a form of "red company unionism," younger workers who might have been won 
over to the left on union issues were instead driven into the growing anti-communist camp. Where 
these disaffected forces coalesced around a militant and charismatic leader--such as  Reuther in the 
UAW, Curran in the NMU, or Quill in the Transport Workers--the party suffered some of its 
worst setbacks after the war.18 
In the ILWU the pro-Soviet left heartily embraced the "labor sacrifice" line, a t  least in 
words. "The program for production and supply and victory must supersede all things and all 
desires," Bridges told a group of civic leaders in 1942. "Labor's enemy is not management," he 
explained. "Its enemy--our enemy--is Hitler and Japan. Only that employer or that 
representative of management--or union representative, for that matter--who is not first of all 
concerned with the full war effort and victory is the contemporary enemy of all of us." Getting 
down to brass tacks, Bridges told the San Francisco CIO council exactly what it had to do to win 
the war: "The majority of the time of officers, of grievance committeemen, of the unions a s  a 
whole must go to winning the war, How? Production. I'd rather say speed-up, and I mean speed- 
up. To put it bluntly, I mean your unions today must become instruments of speed-up of the 
working people of ~rnerica." l9 
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Bridges's rhetoric aside, the reality of the war for most longshoremen was not all sacrifice 
or speed-up. In fact, as we will see, the ILWU's left-wing leadership managed to strike a fairly 
reasonable balance between the demands of increased production and the protection of the rank 
and file's immediate~economic interests. Carefully avoiding the kind of super patriotism that 
contributed to the CP's demise in auto and elsewhere, these leaders met their wartime obligations 
without sacrificing the union's coveted job control. As a result, Bridges and the left came out of 
the war in a more secure position, with their trade union credentials intact and their stewardship 
of the union secure. 
The Battle for Prmiuction on the Docks 
The ILWU's commitment to the war effort was embodied in a document titled "A Plan for 
Maximum Production in Maritime Transport of War Materials and Supplies." Known as the 
"Bridges Plan," it called for the creation of a tripartite industry council--composed of 
representatives from the waterfront employers, the union, and the government--for the purpose of 
"securing more efficient operation" on the waterfront. As part of its sweeping authority, the 
council would be empowered to recommend "changes in or suspensions of working rules that 
interfere with maximum production." The entire package was presented to San Francisco 
longshoremen a t  a special "stop work" meeting a few days after Pearl Harbor. Without a single 
2 0 voice raised in opposition, the membership voted unanimously to put the plan into effect a t  once. 
Longshoremen in the Northwest were less enthralled with the plan, viewing with suspicion 
any arrangement predicated on union and employer collaboration. Following their deeply 
ingrained syndicalist inclinations, locals in Portland and Seattle, as well as in the smaller 
Washington ports of Aberdeen, Everett, and Bellingham withheld their formal endorsement for 
three months. The employers, though responding favorably to the plan's emphasis on improving 
efficiency, also expressed reservations. They, too, objected to the council idea, characterizing it a s  
an unnecessary "invasion of managementn and accusing Bridges of "trying to socialize the 
industry." Pressure from the War Shipping Administration finally brought the shipowners around 
in March 1942 when, with the creation of the Pacific Coast Maritime Industry Board, the Bridges 
Plan became operative in all West Coast ports.21 
Fears that the board might serve as a beachhead for socialism or as  an instrument of class 
collaboration proved groundless. Neither the employers nor the union, after years of bitter 
struggle and deep mutual distrust, were prepared to concede any real ground. Steering away from 
the highly contentious issues of union job control and managerial prerogatives, the board confined 
itself to surveying port conditions, monitoring the labor supply and generally working to eliminate 
any obvious bottlenecks in loading and discharging cargo. The result was a slight gain in 
productivity. In June, board chairman Paul Eliel, representing the government, reported that 
longshore output had increased a t  least 10 percent since March. One month later the 
u, a reliable industry journal, placed the increase a t  between 10 and 15 percent. 22 
Much of this improvement, however, was a result of the board's rationalization of 
production, rather than any retreat by the union. "The bald fact is that the notorious inefficiency 
of cargo handling in our Pacific Coast ports continues almost unabated," reported employer 
spokesman Frank Foisie. Speaking before San Francisco's elite Commonwealth Club in July, he 
placed the blame on the union's refusal to lift its "restrictive practices": 
The Board guarantees to restore any and all restrictive rules a t  the end of 
the war if the Union will abandon them for the duration. The responsibility for this 
refusal rests squarely on the Union leadership. The argument advanced is that the 
morale of the men will suffer. 
In addition to restrictive work rules, restrictive practices which are fastened 
on the industry by job-action of the last eight years have also been continued in full 
vigor. These restrictive practices are evident on much if not most of the work and 
witnessed daily; feet still drag; loafing is widespread; leaving the job and the dock 
while on pay is common; early quitting and late starting is general; use of 
unnecessary men; the list is long. The facts are evident. 2 3 
Foisie's assessment was shared by a host of government officials assigned to the industry. 
Military officers in San Pedro attributed the port's "inefficient1 loading operation to sling load 
restrictions imposed by the union. Following a War Shipping Administration report that was 
highly critical of the ILWU's sling load limits, the board retained Captain Joseph Tipp, an expert 
in maritime transportation, to conduct an on-site inspection of cargo-handling procedures on the 
West Coast. Tipp's final report, based on observations of 113 vessels, showed that as many as  
one-third were plagued by "bad operations" of various kinds. 24 
The union defended its efforts before a Congressional subcommittee formed in March 1943 
to investigate Foisie's latest allegation that the ILWU was, as  he put it, "practicing an organized 
slowdown." Bridges testified that the longshoremen were fully prepared "to tear up our trade 
union contract. Anything that will increase production we will do." He and other witnesses 
attributed any inefficiencies to employer mismanagement, citing numerous cases of improperly 
stowed and damaged cargo, inadequate loading gear, and unnecessary delays in sailing. After 
hearing several days of testimony from both sides, committee chairman Senator Sheridan Downey 
decided that Foisie's charge was without f o ~ n d a t i o n . ~ ~  
Yet if union leaders were not promoting a deliberate slowdown, they were not exactly 
tearing up the contract either. On paper, it is true, the longshoremen gave up far more than the 
employers: of the 41 Orders issued by the Board through 1943, all but 5 entailed some degree of 
sacrifice on the part of the union. But, according to Eliel, the ILWU did not really concede very 
much in the end. "I have gone over the Orders issued by this Board, one by one," he wrote: 
and I fail to see how any of them, without exception, can be considered as entailing 
a real sacrifice on the part of the Union or of the longshoremen. It is true that 
some of them have been directed toward practices which have accumulated over the 
years but which no one can defend. In these instances . . . [union leaders] have 
merely carried out what the Union was already obligated to carry out under the 
terms of its contract with the employers.26 
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At the same time, Eliel acknowledged that many longshoremen had shouldered great 
personal sacrifices as  part of their patriotic obligation. Though not required to work more than ten 
hours in any one stretch, many gangs routinely worked shifts of twelve hours or more for days on 
end. "You could refuse to work overtime," recalls San Francisco longshoreman Asher Harer, a 
member of the Socialist Workers Party, a Trotskyist organization that opposed the war, but "there 
was such pressure to win this war, to get those supplies going, that if you had raised any hell 
about it, you would have been sort of a half-way traitor." 
The patriotic consensus was overpowering at times. When the situation demanded it, 
longshoremen turned in nearly superhuman efforts. Numerous ship turnaround records were set, 
as  vessels carrying urgently needed military supplies were discharged in about half the normal 
time.27 The ILWUYs no-strike pledge, reflected in popular slogans like "Keep I t  Moving," 
produced a marked decrease in work stoppages. In San Francisco, job actions declined from an 
average of 43 incidents a year before Pearl Harbor to fewer than 5 each year during the war. 
And, unlike earlier stoppages, most wartime job actions were small scale and defensive in nature, 
often directed at petty military regulations against smoking on the job or bringing lunchboxes 
aboard'ship.28 
But wartime patriotism, though certainly powerful, was not omnipotent. When Bridges 
proposed an incentive pay scheme to the membership of San Francisco's Local 10, reaction was 
decidedly hostile. Jerry Cronin, a former Wobbly and a veteran of the 1934 strike, spoke in 
opposition. "I've listened very respectfully to everything you've said, President Bridges," he 
began, "but it boils down to piecework, the very thing the trade union movement has always 
fought. When I was a Wobbly we fought piecework . . . in 1934 we fought i t .  . . . We wouldn't 
take it then, and we're not going to take it now." Whereupon Bridges quietly dropped his proposal 
rather than engage the membership in a drawn-out and potentially divisive fight2' 
Bridges's flexibility on the issue of incentive pay contrasts sharply with the role of the left 
in other unions. In the UAW, for instance, the Communist Party and its allies waged a much 
more determined effort on behalf of incentives. Ignoring clear and mounting opposition from the 
rank and file, the Communist-supported left pushed its unpopular piecework proposal for more 
than four months. Finally, after being voted down by practically every governing body within the 
union, the issue of incentive pay died on the floor of the 1943 UAW convention--only to be 
resurrected a few years later by anti-communists who pointed to it as  an example of the party's 
collaborationist posture during the war. 3 0 
If the ILWU's left-wing leadership showed greater sensitivity to the interests of the rank 
and file it was partly because Communist marine workers on the West Coast were less determined 
in carrying out the CP's "national unity" line. Many seamen found Browder's argument for inter- 
class cooperation difficult to accept. Bill Bailey, for one, refused to follow the new line. After 
reading the first three pages of Teheran A m e r i c ~  a widely distributed pamphlet in which 
Browder elaborated his vision of class collaboration, Bailey, an open Communist and official in the 
Marine Firemen's Union, had seen enough. "I was supposed to sell a hundred copies, but I 
couldn't sell a book," he recalls. 
I could see something was wrong here. Marx had said we are in a constant class 
struggle. And here we're coming up saying this struggle is being taken over by a 
group of so-called "progressive capitalists," that the lamb is gonna lay down with 
the lion. Who are they talkin' to? Here you are, I'm getting my face beat in, 
kicked around, half dead for talking about class struggle and now they're gonna say 
everything was all wrong. We got a beautiful society. Bullshit! I t  doesn't work 
that way.31 
The seamen's gut-level militancy rubbed off on some of their comrades within the 
waterfront section of the party, creating a rift in some ILWU locals between hard-line followers of 
Browder and those who adopted a more flexible approach. In San Francisco this split surfaced in 
the fall of 1942 during a special membership meeting called to discuss the Maritime Industry 
Board's recent action ordering the union to raise its sling load limit for cement from 22 to 30 one- 
hundred-pound bags per load. Browderite John Schomaker, a highly respected veteran of the 1934 
strike, announced that the Communist Party supported the proposed 3,000-pound limit as  a means 
. . . . 
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of aiding the war effort. Moreover, he argued, increasing the sling load was consistent with the 
union's own policy of doing everything within its power to maximize production. Another member 
of the party, Archie Brown, then jumped to his feet, demanding to be recognized. Turning to 
Schomaker, he insisted that the party had not yet reached a decision concerning load limits but 
that in his opinion the men should resolutely oppose any increase. "It simply ain't true," he said, 
"that that is what's gonna win the war." The membership agreed and voted to retain the existing 
2,200-pound limit.32 
Other locals followed suit. Union leaders in Seattle reported that the men were "up in 
arms" over the board's ruling and that "many of them have threatened to leave the industry if 
orders of this kind keep coming in." In San Pedro, defiant dockworkers continued building 2,200- 
pound loads, much to the dismay of local waterfront employers whose repeated threats of 
disciplinary action failed to bring compliance. Without the active support of union leaders for the 
30 bag limit, the board's order soon became a dead letter on the docks.33 
The sling load controversy illustrates the complexity of working-class consciousness during 
the war. In objecting to heavier load limits for cement, union leaders cited safety concerns. But 
this was largely a smokescreen, for inexperienced army recruits had been building 30 bag loads for 
some time without problems. What was really a t  stake was not so much a question of safety as it 
was a question of control. The longshoremen worked longer hours, put up with annoying military 
regulations, and even speeded-up when they were convinced that doing so would aid the war effort, 
but they alone decided how, when, and to what degree such sacrifices were to be made. In 
contrast, the directive ordering the union to raise its sling load limits for cement was seen as  
threatening the men's autonomy on the job and hence their ability, achieved through years of 
struggle, to control the terms of their own sacrifice. By resisting the board's order, the 
longshoremen were saying, in effect, that any sacrifices on their part would be made voluntarily 
and without coercion, or not a t  all. 
In this way, the wartime ethic of personal sacrSce was held in check by the strong 
tradition of job control that came out of the violent waterfront struggles of the 1930s. Although 
. . . ' 
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certain contract provisions were watered down by the board's actions, the union's position was 
never seriously compromised. Even some of Bridges's most vocal left-wing critics, when pressed 
on the question of the union's wartime record, admit that the ILWU avoided many of the excesses 
committed in other "Stalinist unions." According to Asher Harer, the ILWU was one of the few 
Communist-led unions where, in his words, "working conditions didn't deteriorate too much. This 
is a union that had just come out of two strikes, had a very militant rank and file, and they just 
weren't about to work themselves to 
Comparison of labor productivity rates before and during the war also suggests that there 
was no widespread speed-up. Time-series data, available for both San Francisco and San Pedro, 
show little change in productivity between the two periods. From 1936 to 1939, San Francisco 
longshoremen loaded and discharged an average of 2.19 tons of cargo per work hour, compared to 
2.21 tons from 1942 to 1945. In San Pedro labor productivity actually declined from a prewar 
average of 2.44 tons per work hour to 2.18 tons during the war.35 
In Portland, the pace of work slowed so much that newer workers "were spoiled" by their 
wartime experience, recalls veteran longshoreman Joe Werner. Younger men who secured work 
on the docks a t  that time "thought longshoring was a picnic." Indeed, one of the union's most 
restrictive work rules originated during the war. Known as  "four onlfour off," it grew out of the 
standard procedure of splitting the eight-man hold gang into two teams, each working its side of 
the hold, handling every other draft. Normally, this division of labor kept both teams constantly 
occupied, for a s  one was busy stowing, the other was finishing up and getting ready to catch the 
next load. But as  the nature of cargo changed during the war from fairly uniform civilian 
commodities to more bulky and irregularly shaped military supplies such as  jeeps, tanks, and 
planes, the work area beneath the hatch was no longer spacious enough to accommodate both 
teams working simultaneously. The necessity of working only one team a t  a time soon evolved 
into a full-blown system of "four on/four off," in which one team worked continuously for the fvst 
half of 'the shift, then rested while the other team worked the second half. With tacit approval 
from stevedoring operators who saw this arrangement as a way of padding their cost-plus 
contracts with the War Shipping Administration, "four onlfour off' became an institutionalized 
practice in many ports, remaining one of the union's most potent work rules for years to come. 36 
On balance, then, the longshoremen surrendered very little while maintaining and in some 
cases increasing their control over the job. No amount of rhetoric calling on the longshoremen to 
sacrifice could change one simple but important fact: the workers, not the union or Bridges, 
"owned" their jobs, and they were the ones who, torn by the conflicting loyalties of nationalism and 
class, ultimately determined the proper mix of accommodation and resistance on the docks during 
the war. 
On those rare occasions when union leaders veered too far in either direction, they paid for 
it. In May 1944 Bridges called upon the membership to continue the no-strike pledge for the 
duration and "indefinitely thereafter," provided that the employers agreed to respect the union's 
security after the war. Arguing that such a "security preamble" belonged in every union contract, 
Bridges told the membership of Local 6, representing 5,000 Bay Area warehouse workers, that 
"we reject any hostility of labor to capital as such, and any hostility to unions as  such, knowing 
well that such approaches are luxuries that neither can now afford." The motion passed with only 
three dissenting votes.37 Bridges had greater difficulty selling the security preamble to the more 
militant dockworkers, however, whose representatives, meeting in a coastwide longshore caucus 
that summer, voted 120 to 55 in favor. Less than a month later James Kearney, a leading anti- 
communist, defeated a Bridges-supported candidate for the presidency of Local 10. Although the 
security preamble was not a central issue in the campaign, Kearney's election was seen by many 
as  a slap in the face of the pro-production left.38 
Kearney's upset victory was a powerful statement of just how far the rank and file was 
willing to go to win the war. In weighing the nation's interests against their own as  workers, the 
. longshoremen were deeply influenced by the militant work culture of the waterfront, which exerted 
such pull on the men that few were willing to sacrifice their union's class struggle principles on the 
altar of national unity. 
THE "GREAT TRANSFORMATION" OF LABOR 
The wartime mobilization of American society created deep and lasting social dislocations 
in the civilian labor force. Within a year of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the number of 
men in uniform skyrocketed from a previous peacetime high of 800,000 to over 6 million. Despite 
the large number of former civilian employees entering the armed services during this period, the 
national labor force grew by more than 5 million workers. In 1943, as  the war entered its decisive 
stages, a second wave of recruits was inducted into the military, creating gaping holes in the 
civilian work force. Their places were filled by putting the unemployed to work and redirecting 
hundreds of thousands of already employed workers, including many women, into more essential 
war industries. With workers coming and going in all directions by the end of the year, the 
resulting "structure of our labor force," noted the director of the War Manpower Commission, 
"represented a great transformation from what it was in 1 9 4 0 . " ~ ~  
This great transformation was mirrored in the changing membership base of the CIO. 
National mobilization removed from the shop floor many of the youthful insurgents who had 
participated in the mass social struggles that built the new unions. Some were among the 11 
million draftees or volunteers who entered the armed services. Others followed the movement of 
capital rather than the flag, seeking occupational deferments and higher wages in the expanding 
defense sector. In certain "essential industries," it is true, the prewar labor force was frozen in 
place for the duration. But even where mobility was most restricted, many experienced workers 
moved out of their old jobs and into more skilled or supervisory positions. Each of these paths-- 
whether leading to the armed forces, defense production, or occupational upgrading--drew many of 
the CIO's founding cadre out of their familiar workplaces and away from trusted co-workers, thus 
shattering the social combinations inside the shops which up to that point had provided much of 
the impetus and rank-and-file direction for the industrial union rnovement40 
In the wake of these departing CIO militants came a flood of less union-conscious workers. 
Recruited largely from among the urban unemployed, the surp'lus agricultural labor force, and 
other nonunionized sectors of the economy, most lacked even a rudimentary understanding of basic 
trade union principles. Compared to the veteran unionists they were replacing, these newer 
workers held more "negative or passive attitudes" toward the CIO's progressive social unionism, 
writes Joshua Freeman. "Some were still deeply immersed in rural, preindustrial cultures. Many 
had racial attitudes formed in the 
The membership turnover was greatest in the mass-production unions, especially those 
based in the defense sector. Consider the case of the UE. During the war more than 200,000 of 
its members, including many local officers, union organizers, and even an international official, left 
for the armed forces. At the same time, tens of thousands of incoming workers filled job vacancies 
as fast as  they were being created by the mass exodus of military conscripts, on the one hand, and 
the war-stimulated demand for labor in electrical and machine-working plants, on the other. In 
1943 the annual rate of turnover for UE workers was around 50 percent. By the end of the war 
more than 400,000 new members had passed through the UE's revolving doors. The turnover in 
leadership was so high that, a t  the union's biennial convention in 1944, more than half of all 
voting delegates were attending foi. the first time.42 
This wartime disruption of the labor force undermined the political base of the UE's left- 
wing leadership. Newer workers, in particular, proved to be unstable allies of the left. Unlike the 
union pioneers they replaced, the "war babies" lacked strong attachments to the older generation 
of radical 1eade1-s.~~ Hardly any were even aware, much less appreciative, of the Communists' 
role as  militant founders of the UE. Of course, the party's own wartime policy of concealing its 
identity by hiding behind various patriotic "fronts" did little to counter this lapse in historical 
memory. But the characteristics of the "war babies" themselves--their comparatively weak ties to 
the left, their lack of union experience, and their generally more conservative outlook--also led 
them to side with the anti-communist International Union of Electrical Workers after the war. 
The UE's experience was replicated in other large industrial unions. In the UAW, wartime 
mobilization radically altered the composition of the labor force. Figures are not available on the 
number of union members who left the industry during the war, but in Detroit, the center of auto 
production, almost 30 percent of the city's male workers entered the militaryP4 This massive 
exodus, combined with countless voluntary withdrawals from the industry for personal reasons, 
set off a large counter-migration. Between 1940 and 1943 an estimated 500,000 migrants came 
to Detroit in search of work. Of this total, all but 60,000 were white, and many were from the 
South and Appalachia. The wartime restructuring of the labor force in auto, as  among electrical 
workers, was accompanied by a shift to the right in union politics, contributing in no small 
measure to Reuther's victory a few years later. 4 5 
On the docks, as  we will see, the transformation of labor was neither as  great nor as  
destructive of the left. Compared to other industrial unions, the ILWU lost far fewer militants to 
the war effort. And, most important, many of those who did leave, especially in the critical San 
Francisco local, were replaced by leftist sympathizers whose active participation in the union's 
political life helped to neutralize the wartime influx of more conservative workers. 
& s t r u c t u r i n g  Docbide Labor Force 
The demographic convulsion that shook the social foundations of radicalism in basic 
industry was less of a destabilizing force on the West Coast waterfront. Unlike both the UE and 
the UAW, which lost many of their founding militants to the war effort, the ILWU emerged from 
the war with its original membership base fairly intact and solidly behind its left-wing leaders. 
A good indication of the longshoremen's greater stability is the low rate of military 
withdrawals from the industry during the first several months of the war. According to labor 
turnover data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), roughly 15 percent of the nation's 
manufacturing labor force entered the armed services within a year of Pearl  arbor^^ Although 
the BLS failed to collect equivalent data for the longshore industry, the available evidence, culled 
from union documents, suggests that the rate of military separations on the waterfront was well 
below the national average reported for manufacturing workers. The most complete information 
concerning labor turnover on the West Coast docks was compiled by union officers in San Pedro. 
Their records show that a total of 77 longshoremen were inducted into the armed forces during the 
first eleven months of the war. Given that the local's membership was around 2,500 at the time, 
only about 3 percent of the work force had entered the military by the end of the year; this was 
about one-fifth the rate of induction for manufacturing workers.47 
If the figure for San Pedro seems low--almost unbelievably so when compared to the tens of 
thousands of electrical, auto, and other manufacturing workers who were then entering the 
military--it was by no means unusual on the waterfront. Similarly low rates of militai-y 
separation were reported elsewhere on the West Coast. In San Francisco, the only other port for 
which such data are available, 850 longshoremen served in the military between 1942 and 1945. 
At this rate of withdrawal spread out over four years of war, fewer than 20 of the local's 9,500 
members left the waterfront each month for military service. Overall, less than 10 percent of the 
port's longshoremen served in the armed f o r c e ~ ~ ~ - - c o m ~ a r e d  to 30 percent of Detroit's auto labor 
force and what was probably an even higher proportion of inductees in electrical manufacturing. 
The low rate of military separations on the docks was partly a consequence of the strategic 
importance of the marine transport industry to the war effort. Following the designation of 
longshoring as  an "essential activity,'*. most men became eligible for occupational deferments. But 
it was not only their draft exempt status that held the longshoremen in place. An even more 
important source of stability was their intense occupational loyalty, which had been built upon 
years of collective struggle and enduring generational bonds, and conditioned by a high degree of 
job satisfaction. This sense of occupational identity was so developed among ILWU inductees that 
several hundred continued working together discharging military cargo a s  members of the army's 
"Longshore Battalions." Even as  soldiers, many longshoremen managed to stay in close contact 
with the ~ a t e r f r o n t . ~ ~  
Of course, military separations were neither the only nor the most important source of 
labor force instability during the war. What the BLS classified as "voluntary quits" were a far 
more frequent cause of turnover, representing anywhere from one-half to two-thirds of all wartime 
separations, depending on the i n d ~ s t r y . ~ '  
In the longshore industry, the quit rate soared during the fust months of the war. The 
near total collapse of commercial shipping following Pearl Harbor and the consequent return of 
Depression-era levels of unemployment triggered a massive exodus from the waterfront. In San 
Pedro, where commercial activity was limited to one banana boat per week throughout the first 
half of 1942, almost 1,200 men left the docks in search of steadier work. Longshore employment 
in the Northwest also plummeted as  the bulk of overseas shipments, consisting almost entirely of 
military cargo, was rerouted through the army's main port of embarcation in San ~ r a n c i s c o ~ '  
But the dispersal of the dockside labor force was limited in both time and space. In 
November, with fighting in the Pacific escalating, the army opened up San Pedro as a port of 
embarcation to handle the increasing overflow from San Francisco. Almost overnight cargo began 
piling up on the docks. When the call went out for experienced longshoremen, hundreds of San 
Pedro dockworkers returned to the waterfront to claim their former jobs. Nearly 500 men came 
back from San Francisco where they had been working as  temporary "permit men." After the 
first of the year another group of 400 longshoremen began returning from the nearby shipyards 
with statements, signed by local waterfront employers, specifically requesting their services. By 
the middle of 1943, with all but 150 men back on the docks, San Pedro's prewar labor force had 
been largely reconstituted. 5 2 
Portland's labor force went through a similar cycle of disruption and reconstitution. After 
the initial drop-off in commercial shipping, many of the local's 800 members were forced to find 
work in the shipyards or to transfer to the busy San Francisco waterfront. Some were able to 
return from the shipyards after Portland was declared an auxiliary military port late in 1942. 
But most stayed put until the spring of 1944 when, with the revival of shipping in the Northwest, 
all the rest of the local's members were called back from the shipyards and San F'ranciscoP3 
As this information suggests, the high quit rate on the docks during the first months of the 
war paints a very misleading picture. Many longshoremen did leave the industry at that time, but 
the number of permanent quits represented only a small fraction of all separations. Most of what 
appeared as "voluntary quits" through the first half of 1942 were really short-term withdrawals; 
practically all were either intraunion transferees who never left the industry or men who; if they 
did venture from the waterfront, typically returned a t  the first possible opening. 
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Although the existing dockside labor force remained relatively stable, thousands of new 
workers entered the industry during the war. San Francisco's labor force more than doubled, 
growing from 4,400 men in 1938 to more than 9,000 by the end of the war. The rate of increase 
was even greater in San Pedro, where the number of registered longshoremen grew by 160 
percent between June 1943 and January 1945. In Seattle, which supported a prewar labor force 
of 1,500, more than 5,000 new recruits were put to work during the last three years of the war. 54 
The political impact of this wartime influx varied somewhat from local to local, depending 
on the social backgrounds and ideological propensities of the new workers. In San Francisco, 
many of the earliest recruits were radicals of one type or another who had transferred into Local 
10 from ILWU "sister locals" in the Bay Area. Attracted by the more congenial political climate 
on the docks, more than a few of the warehousemen, shipscalers, and cargo checkers who applied 
for membership in Local 10 early in 1942 did so out of personal political convictions. Several were 
products of the city's vital left-wing political movement. Many had been active for years on the 
fringes of the Communist Party, and some were members of the Socialist Workers Party, while 
others simply admired Bridges's courage and the militancy of the longshoremen. Far from 
depleting the left, these activist "war babies" infused the local with fresh radical blood.55 
Outside of San Francisco, most early wartime recruits joined the union through its 
program of sponsorship in which current members nominated sons or close relatives for 
membership. Known as  the "brother-in-law" system of hiring, this practice facilitated the 
transmission of dockside political culture from one generation to the next. Consequently, many of 
the younger men brought in during the initial phases of the war entered the union with a generally 
favorable view of Bridges and the left.56 
But intraunion transfers and "hereditary recruitment" were stopgap measures a t  best. As 
the flow of military shipments out of San Francisco began picking up in the summer of 1942, the 
growing demand for labor soon outstripped available supplies. Later that year, the ILWU, led by 
Local 10, opened its doors for the first time to industry outsiders. 
2 2 
One of the largest and most politically important groups to enter the union a t  this time was 
made up of black longshoremen from the Gulf, who had been drawn to the West Coast after 
shipping in their home ports was sharply curtailed by German submarine activity. Many had 
belonged to dissident locals of the ILA, particularly around the ports of New Orleans and Houston, 
which had long histories of opposing the Jim Crow and collaborationist policies of international 
union leaders. By the middle of 1943 several hundred black dockworkers from Louisiana and 
southwest Texas were a t  work on the waterfront, mostly in the busy port of San F'ranciscoP7 
The predominantly white work force did not roll out the red carpet for these black workers, 
especially in the outlying ports. In San Pedro, two union members, exercising the "choose your 
job" clause, quit work when three blacks were dispatched to their gang. Local leaders promptly 
investigated the incident and, after determining that the walkout constituted a violation of the 
union's no-discrimination policy, threatened the two with immediate expulsion unless they made a 
full public apology for their actions and returned to work a t  once. In Portland, where blacks were 
first introduced to the waterfront a s  strikebreakers in 1922, the reception was colder still. Facing 
growing pressure from the international, the local union agreed to accept blacks as probationary 
members, but refused to dispatch them from the hall or extend full union voting rights to them. 
Bridges, in a letter to the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, promised to take 
"immediate and drastic steps ...to correct this situation." But despite continuing efforts by the 
international, Portland's membership remained lily-white throughout the warP8 
Opposition to the international union was based mainly among the large number of "Okies" 
and "rednecks" who had migrated to the West Coast in search of work during the war. Still 
deeply influenced by their rural cultures, and guided a t  every turn by the ideology of rugged 
individualism, traditional morality, and conservative religious beliefs, these white "war babies" 
fought the union's left-wing leaders every bit as vigorously a s  they fought the shipowners.59 In 
San Pedro, where "rednecks" led the fight against the ILWUYs nodiscrimination policy, their vocal 
opposition and continuing harassment of blacks kept the port's racial ca;ldron boiling, while in 
Portland, they, along with returning shipyard workers, launched a vicious smear campaign against 
local progressives, denouncing them as "reds" and "commies" and threatening to lead a mass 
defection from the "communistic" ILWU. Summing up their case before the membership in 1943, 
a leading right-winger declared that "when the local voted to keep out the 'niggers' they should 
have voted to kick out the 'commies' also--and maybe they will.o6o 
Blacks found the political climate more to their liking in San Francisco. Beginning with the 
1934 strike, when two black longshoremen--both members of the Communist Party--served on the 
San Francisco strike committee, the local had distinguished itself as a haven of racial equality.61 
By the time the 1936-1937 strike rolled around, 15 black workers were serving on the local strike 
committee. That year, after three blacks were elected to its executive board, Local 10 instituted a 
special anti-discrimination committee to see that no worker was discriminated against because of 
race or color. Then in 1938 a black longshoreman was elected to the all-important post of job 
dispatcher. The local continued its color-blind policies throughout the war, clamping down hard 
and fast on anything that even remotely smacked of racism. 62 
Local 10's commendable civil rights record attracted the attention of minority workers in 
other West Coast industries. When the shipyards began laying off in mid-1944, many blacks 
headed for the docks, drawn by the promise of social equality and steady postwar employment. In 
San Pedro, nearly one-fifth of the 2,600 men added to the labor force between July 1944 and July 
1945 were black. During the same period Seattle put 3,100 men to work, including a small 
number of blacks. Only Portland remained unaffected, taking in 557 men, most of them white 
former members of the local returning from other ports or the shipyards. But the racial 
composition of Local 10 was radically transformed. Of the 6,600 men added to the port's labor 
force during the last twelve months of the war, nearly half were blacks who had recently been 
released from the shipyards. By the end of 1945 the San Francisco local was almost one-third 
black.63 
These later black arrivals, taking political direction from their predecessors, fell in with the 
left--a relationship that deepened with the growing political sophistication of the new recruits. In 
1943 the union instituted a mandatory educational program designed to acquaint its newer 
members with the ILWUYs progressive traditions. I t  proved to be an  eye-opener for many "war 
babies," especially blacks whose earlier union experience had been in the shipyards. Cleophas 
Williams's response was in many ways typical. Describing his introduction to Local 10 in the fall 
of 1944 a s  "almost a religious experience," he recalls: 
I knew nothin' about trade unions before I went into the ILWU. As a child I read 
about the strikes on the West Coast, in the coal mines, auto and steel. And I was 
in a right-to-work state, and the newspapers had everything slanted against 
unions, talkin' about the benevolence of Henry Ford and all that kind of stuff. I 
had no idea that the purpose of the union was to upgrade the way the ILWU did. 
The electrical union [in the shipyard] was inert, so far as  moving you from one 
position to another. But the ILWU made you politically aware. 
As part of their political socialization, probationary members of Local 10 had to become 
registered voters and attend required classes a t  the city's left-wing California Labor School before 
being considered for full union membership. "Once you went to the California Labor School and 
were among other workers, hearing different talk, different rhetoric, you began to question, you 
began to see. It  was a conversion," Williams explained, again using religious imagery to convey 
the depths of his personal transformation. 
It was "All this time I've been in the dark, and now I'm beginning to see the light. 
Why did you keep my eyes closed for so long?" It was a beautiful experience to see 
how you could be in concert with other workers to improve your lot, and not be out 
there saying "You gotta hustle, hustle, hustle and you can get ahead, son." That's 
what I was taught--not to come together with the energies of other people and 
combine those energies for the cause of all.64 
White radicals played a key role in winning over San Francisco's increasingly active black 
membership. As the war was winding down and cutbacks in the labor force became imminent, 
different factions within the local began jockeying for position. Conservatives called for restoring 
the work force to its prewar level by laying off workers on a strict seniority basis. The left, 
charging that this would eliminate most black newcomers, countered by advocating less severe 
cuts. Both plans were aired in the spring of 1945 a t  a special "stop work" meeting of the entire 
local. At a critical point in the discussion, a white worker rose and asked Bridges to spell out 
exactly how he intended to deal with the "excessive number" of blacks once the war was over and 
work slacked off. Bridges replied evasively a t  first, saying that the real problem was not the 
apparent surplus of blacks but rather the capitalist system itself, which forced workers to compete 
with one another for jobs. Then, returning to the original question, he added that if work ever 
slowed to the point that there were only two workers left on the docks, he personally believed that 
one should be black. Williams, along with most other blacks in attendance, was taken aback. 
Bridges's statement, he remembers, 
was very shocking to me because there was no political gain for him by making this 
statement. There was no gain even among blacks a t  that particular time because 
many of the blacks were still on probation, so they couldn't vote. I considered it a 
statement of conviction. I was shocked. I had read and been exposed to some of 
the left-wing forces, but I had never heard anyone put his neck on the chopping 
block by making a public statement of this kind.65 
Work remained plentiful for some time after VJ day a s  troops and material still had to be 
brought home from across the Pacific. With the demand for labor running high, the union's 
"indefinite" no-strike pledge did not last very long. In the fall of 1946 the ILWU struck the West 
Coast for 52 days. A year of labor peace followed while the anti-union Taft-Hartley Act worked its 
way through Congress. Then in 1948 the longshoremen hit the bricks again in a protracted and 
often bitter walkout reminiscent of the union's prewar battles. The shipowners, armed with Taft- 
Hartley, demanded that Bridges "disavow communism" and sign the non-communist affidavit as  
required by the act's Section 901) or step down from leadership. Bridges refused, and the 
longshoremen, registering their opinion in a coastwide referendum, supported their leader's 
decision by a twenty-to-one margin. The impasse was finally broken after 98 days when the union 
agreed to accept a stricter system of arbitration and an  unprecedented three-year contract in 
exchange'for most of its other demands. 66 
The postwar strikes evidenced a widening breach between ILWU leaders and youthful 
strike activists for whom 1946 and 1948 were the "Big Strikes." Bridges, the militant leader of an 
earlier generation, was now seen by some as being too soft on the shipowners. During the 1946 
walkout, Bridges and the left came under fire for agreeing to work military cargo, a policy that 
insurgents denounced as  "half a strike." In 1948, with young militants determined to conduct a 
tighter strike, the union extended mass picketing to the major military docks67 
Dissidents from 1946 and 1948 joined together with a few older syndicalists and the war- 
swollen ranks of ideological conservatives to form a viable right-wing opposition in many locals. 
For some, opposition to the Communist-supported left made good political sense in Cold War 
America, whereas for others it was more a matter of dollars and cents. Sometimes the two 
concerns overlapped, as  in the spirited 1950 debate over U.S. policy in Korea, when rightists 
defended the government's actions both on patriotic grounds and because it would mean an 
increase in military shipments from the West 
When the postwar slump in shipping finally hit early in 1949, conservatives coalesced 
around a defensive strategy of job control unionism. In Local 10, leaders of a recently organized 
"Blue Slatew--so named to distinguish it from "reds" who were running in the upcoming local 
election--circulated petitions calling for sharp reductions in the number of workers. When black 
leaders voiced their concerns, a spokesman for the Blue Slate tersely replied: "We can work 
together, we can eat together, but we can't starve together." The left, a s  in the past, came out 
strongly against any system of layoffs that singled out blacks as its primary victims. The left- 
wing president of the local, Henry Schmidt, proposed cutting equally from "the top, middle, and 
bottom" of the seniority ladder. Both plans were eventually rejected by the rank and file, with the 
result that no cutbacks were made.69 
The political factionalism that had been growing in many locals spilled out onto the floor of 
the ILWU convention a few months later. Meeting behind closed doors, delegates representing 
nearly 100,000 longshoremen, warehouse workers, and farm laborers from the West Coast, 
Alaska, and Hawaii engaged in what one correspondent described as  "a masks off, no holds 
barred" exchange over Bridgesy refusal to go along with national CIO policy that supported the 
Marshall Plan and favored withdrawing from the left-wing World Federation of Trade Unions, in 
which Bridges served a s  president of the maritime division. The showdown came on a resolution 
declaring that "the ILWU stands fast on its autonomy" in opposition to the national leadership of 
the CIO. "If they are right," Bridges said just before the vote, "you delegates had better 
reorganize this union and get a different set of officers because the ones that I am speaking for 
. 
now are going to carry on as they have in the last couple of years." The delegates voted 632-112 
to 11-112 in support of ~ r i d ~ e s . ~ '  
The final tally was surprising only for its lopsidedness. Less than a year before, West 
Coast longshoremen had voted by a narrower margin against the Marshall Plan and for Henry 
Wallace's Progressive Party candidacy. Even in the politically charged San Francisco local, which 
was then headed by Kearney and other pro-CIO leaders working openly with the anti-communist 
Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, the rank and file ended up supporting the International's 
position on both issues. 7 1 
As the Cold War descended on the waterfront, the interracial progressive coalition in Local 
10 solidified. Increasingly, black "war babies" and veteran white radicals found themselves in the 
same camp, both victimized by the'growing anti-communist hysteria. sweeping the country. In 
May 1950 the Coast Guard began screening "security risks" off the waterfront. Of the 243 
longshoremen in San Francisco who were eventually denied Coast Guard passes to work on 
military docks, fully two-thirds were black, according to a survey conducted by the union?2 The 
screening of individual subversives turned out to be a dress rehearsal for the screening of entire 
unions. A few weeks later the national CIO expelled the ILWU, along with ten other Communist- 
influenced unions. 
The CIOys actions provided an opportunity for anticommunist forces to more openly 
challenge the ILWUYs political direction. In July, a resolution was introduced in Local 10 pledging 
unconditional support for Truman's invasion of Korea and promising "not to join in, condone, or 
recognize any phony Communist demonstrations ...to halt or... sabotage shipments of war 
materials." Bridges then introduced an alternative resolution in support of the United Nations- 
ordered cease-fire. In the emotional discussion that followed, punches were thrown and the police 
had to be brought in to restore order. Bridges, who was out on bail pending appeal in his latest 
deportation case, was promptly whisked off to jail a s  a threat to national security. In his absence, 
the coastwide longshore caucus voted 63 to 9 to sever relations with the World Federation of Trade 
Unions for its stand against U.S. intervention in ~ o r e a . ~ ~  
Bridges, languishing in jail, appeared to be on his last legs, headed for the same fate as  the 
rest of the left. His incarceration, noted an observer, was the latest in a series of events all 
pointing to "the possibility of a drastic debilitation of leftist leadership in the ILWU." But it was 
not to be. The more Bridges came under attack, the more his traditional allies rallied in defense of 
their embattled leader. "I felt l i e  he was being abused same a s  I was," explained black 
longshoreman Ode11 Franklin, "The only thing different about it was he was a white man gettin' 
it."74 With support from the large wartime influx of blacks, from his allies among the '34 men, 
and from the political left, Bridges was able to ride out the Cold War turbulence that toppled so 
many of his contemporaries in the American labor movement. 
CONCLUSION 
The social and political forces unleashed by World War 11 deflected the radical potential of 
American labor. Once postwar reaction set in, left-wing unionists faced an increasingly hostile 
environment, both within the larger society and within their own unions. Besieged on all sides, 
former activists fell silent or shed their unpopular political commitments. By the early 1950s, the 
radical impulses that had spawned the industrial union movement were little more than a distant, 
ever fading memory--except on the docks, where Bridges and the left were to remain in power for 
many years to come. 
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The relative stability of the prewar labor force, combined with the political neutralization of 
more conservative workers who entered the union during the war, contributed to the resiliency of 
the ILWU's radical leadership. In most locals, the pro-Bridges generation of '34 men remained 
fairly intact, thus avoiding the mass disruption and social decomposition that occurred in auto and 
electronics where the left sustained heavy political losses after the war. Like many industrial 
unions, the ILWU also took in a large number of ideologically conservative "war babies". But 
their political impact was partially offset, particularly in San Francisco, by the early recruitment 
of radical activists from other ILWU locals and by the large wave of sympathetic blacks who came 
onto the docks in the later stages of the war. 
Anti-communist forces on the waterfront were also held in check by the relatively flexible 
and balanced union policy pursued by Bridges and other leftists during the war. Despite the 
rhetoric of labor sacrifice emanating from ILWU headquarters, the union stubbornly "refused to 
give up a single provision of its contracts," as  Bridges himself admitted years later?5 To the 
extent that the dockworkers relaxed certain conditions, they did so voluntarily out of a genuine 
desire to aid the war effort, not because Bridges or some other leader forced them to sacrifice. 
The left's more balanced approach on the West Coast was partly a matter of conscious 
choice and partly a reflection of the militant work culture on the docks. Having just emerged from 
a decade of protracted and often violent struggles against the shipowners, the rank-and-file 
longshoremen were not about to surrender anything without good reason. I t  was their 
uncompromising militancy that kept Bridges honest during the war. Without it, he no doubt would 
have strayed closer to the position of all-out sacrifice advocated by Communist leaders in other 
unions. 
The ILWUYs refusal to give up basic contract conditions significantly narrowed the 
parameters of postwar union factionalism to a more limited range of issues. By delivering the 
goods, the I L W U Y s  pro-production leaders managed to escape the charge of "red company 
unibnismnn that proved so damaging to the left in the UAW and elsewhere. Consequently, when 
anti-communists began organizing in the ILWU after the war, they were unable to fault Bridges 
for his handling of trade union matters. Focusing instead on the union's alleged un-Americanism, 
the right was forced to confine its attack to the political terrain of foreign policy and domestic anti- 
communism, where Bridges and his supporters were on firm enough ground to repel its advances. 
The ILWU7s durability, then, was largely a product of its deviant wartime experience. 
Just how deviant the ILWU was, however, is open to question. Lacking a sufficient number of 
good case studies, generalizations about the war's impact on labor have been based almost entirely 
on the experience of one union--the UAW, about which a great deal has been written. But was the 
UAW, with its high rate of membership turnover and intense political factionalism, all that 
representative of American labor? Is it not possible that these were exceptional features of the 
transportation industry under wartime conditions? The simple truth is that we do not know, for 
the necessary comparative research has yet to be done; when it is, we may find that the UAW7s 
"model" wartime experience was no more paradigmatic than the ILWU's. 
Given what we already know about the histories of particular unions, it seems misleading 
to even speak of h wartime experience, as  if all workers experienced World War 11 in the same 
way. If, in some general sense, the working class as  a whole was subject to many of the same 
pressures during the war, the particular situation facing, say, an autoworker in Detroit or a 
longshoreman in San Francisco was quite different. By investigating such differences in the actual 
lived experiences of autoworkers, longshoremen, and others we can begin to reconstruct the 
wartime history of American labor from the ground up, capturing its richness and complexity in a 
way that may eventually provide more satisfactory explanations for the subsequent triumph of 
business unionism as  well as  the persistence of labor radicalism in unions such as  the ILWU. 
However varied the war's impact may have been, it is clear that World War 11 was a 
major watershed in the formation of the American working class. Just  as  the First World War 
undermined the socialists, the Second World War helped to bury the communists. The attack on 
the left may have been carried out differently in each period--the socialists were faulted for not 
being patriotic enough, the communists for being too much so--but the results were substantially 
the same: the outbreak of war disarmed a growing working-class insurgency, leaving it vulnerable 
to attack afterwards. 
In treating World War I1 as  an important "intervening variable" in class formation, our 
analysis runs counter to the largely ahistorical thrust of most social scientific theorizing on the 
deradicalization of American labor. In this view, the war is dismissed as a mere "event," 
preceding a structured sequence of determined outcomes in which postwar prosperity sets off a 
chain reaction of growing working-class affluence leading to the disintegration of proletarian 
communities, the rise of blue-collar suburbs, changing lifestyles, "embourgeoisement," and, finally, 
the disappearance of the working class itself. 7 6 
The problem with this received view is that it never really explains what holds this causal 
chain together, since the individual links in the argument have no intrinsic meaning outside of 
their socio-historical context. Postwar affluence, for example, has had very different consequences 
for workers' consciousness, producing blue-collar Republicans in America and "rich Communists" 
in France. In both countries, a rising standard of living in and of itself proved less significant than 
the specific political conjuncture in which American and French workers made sense of their new- 
found affluence. That such contingencies are likely, in Zolbergys words, to "wreak havoc with 
theory c o n s t r ~ c t i o n " ~ ~  is all the more reason for incorporating notions of history and human 
agency into social scientific explanations of American labor's postwar trajectory. 
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